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Genetically engineered (GE) crops, multi-ingredient foods derived from one or more 
GE ingredients, and GE agricultural inputs are regulated in the United States under a 
“Coordinated Framework” that was literally cobbled together in the early 1990s. Via this 
Framework, responsibility is spread across three federal agencies for the assessment 
and management of potential risks arising from the planting of GE crops, the raising of 
GE animals, or uses of GE inputs. The Framework was incomplete and conceptually 
flawed from the beginning. Despite multiple, piecemeal efforts to update aspects of GE 
risk assessment and regulatory policy, the Coordinated Framework survives to this day 
largely unchanged. Its shortcomings are recognized in both the scientific and legal com-
munities, but meaningful reforms thus far remain out of reach, blocked by the intense 
controversy now surrounding all things biotech. Five generic reforms and another five 
specific initiatives are described to create a more robust, science-driven GE regulatory 
infrastructure in the U.S.
Keywords: coordinated Framework, substantial equivalence, resistance management, gene editing, scientific 
integrity, resistant weeds, labeling Ge food
Over most of the last 20 years, the limitations of the Coordinated Framework (1), and the U.S. gov-
ernment’s lax approach to genetically engineered (GE) risk assessment, triggered deep-set concern 
and scrutiny among some stakeholders and consumers, food companies, and organizations but not 
much beyond that. In the last 5–10 years though, the slice of U.S. and global markets responsive 
to concerns regarding the safety, environmental impacts, and/or the socioeconomic consequences 
of GE crops and inputs has grown, and is now driving economically meaningful shifts in market 
share (2).
Given that GE applications are now spreading to fresh fruits and vegetables and animals, the 
range of potential risks and gaps in risk-assessment science are likely to become both more acute and 
undeniable. At some point, U.S. Ag Inc., and especially those companies and growers significantly 
dependent on exports, will no longer accept the collateral market damage caused by the shortcomings 
of the Coordinated Framework and the corollary erosion of confidence in the science supporting the 
regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the U.S.
Recognizing the growing demand for constructive change, the Obama Administration announced 
in 2015 that it would undertake a long-overdue review of the Coordinated Framework (3, 4). Their 
goal is to identify at least some improvements that would garner widespread support and could be 
implemented via Executive Orders and/or regulatory policy changes prior to the transition to a new 
Administration in January 2017. As part of this ongoing process, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) issued a notice calling for public comments under the ponderous title: “Clarifying Current 
Roles and Responsibilities Described in the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology 
and Developing a Long-Term Strategy for the Regulation of the Products of Biotechnology” (5).
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Such an Executive Branch review will hopefully guide the 
actions of this and the next Administration, as well as Congress, in 
providing federal agencies a clear mandate and stronger authority 
to conduct state-of-the-art risk assessments on GE plants and 
foods, animals, and microbes. Herein, I describe current agency 
roles and the most important reforms that are needed if this effort 
is to bear fruit worth harvesting.
AGeNcY rOLes AND resPONsiBiLities
the Food and Drug Administration
The FDA was given responsibility for assessment of food safety 
risks and most aspects of food labeling, drawing primarily on 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Agency regulations, 
data requirements, and decision criteria are, in turn, grounded in 
legislation crafted and passed years before the first applications 
of genetic engineering in the food industry and agricultural sec-
tor. While the FDA’s role within the Coordinated Framework is 
arguably the most important in terms of protecting public health, 
its role and actions have for the most part flown below the radar.
The FDA regulates GE animals as new animal drugs, for which 
there is a mandatory, FDCA requirement for a safety assessment. 
For GE plants, FDA regulates them under a 1992 Statement of 
Policy that asserts that GE (a) is just an extension of conventional 
breeding, (b) does not raise new health risks, and (c) does not 
need any special safety assessments once nutritional and compo-
sitional “substantial equivalence” is demonstrated (6).
There is only a cursory agency review of industry-submitted 
documents over the course of a “voluntary consultation” (7, 8). 
The FDA neither conducts research, review experimental designs, 
and statistical analyses nor reaches independent conclusions 
about the safety of a proposed GE trait or plant. In essence, FDA 
has allowed companies to assert that new, “substantially equiva-
lent” GE crops are “generally recognized as safe” (GRAS) (8).
Once so designated, officially or in practice, there is little or no 
justification for any ongoing, food safety-focused regulatory scru-
tiny, or need for federal investment in research on possible food 
safety risks. In short, the FDA’s process and actions suggest that 
the science is settled, despite the lack of modern, well-designed 
studies of the sort needed to detect subtle cellular, metabolic, 
genetic, and epigenetic impacts that do not substantially change 
the nutrient composition of harvested foodstuffs.
the environmental Protection Agency
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was, and remains, 
responsible for the assessment and approval of GE applications 
accompanied by pest management-related claims. EPA science 
reviews and actions evolve in accord with the detailed require-
ments and regulations put in place over decades in administering 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 
an Act addressing chemical and botanical pesticides. The EPA’s 
GE-related responsibilities include
• characterizing and quantifying exposures to novel proteins or 
other toxins produced by GE crops;
• assessing the need for new or altered tolerance levels for GE plant 
proteins and/or pesticides used in conjunction with GE crops;
• determining whether a new GE application poses any new or 
worrisome worker or applicator risk, or environmental risks; and
• addressing the risk of resistance, and whether and how steps 
should be taken via mandatory label directions to mitigate the 
risk of resistance.
The EPA regulates GE microorganisms under the Toxic 
Substance Control Act, despite the indisputable fact that the risks 
stemming from release of GE microorganisms that can reproduce 
and spread are very different than the risks posed by toxic chemi-
cals, which cannot reproduce.
United states Department of Agriculture
Ironically, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)’s 
role in GE regulation is the least important relative to risk iden-
tification and prevention, but has triggered the most extensive 
delays, as well as the most intensely contested litigation and 
public controversy. The USDA regulates the agronomic and some 
environmental impacts of GE plants under the Plant Protection 
Act (PPA), a statute that limits the purview of USDA assessments 
to whether GE plants might act as “plant pests” (e.g., as a weed or 
virus) (8). Thus, if a plant is GE but does not contain genetic mate-
rial from a known, plant pest, the plant is typically not considered 
a “regulated article” (9).
The USDA regulates GE insects under the Animal Plant 
Health Protection Act, which was designed to protect livestock 
and poultry, including farmed fish from animal diseases. Thus, 
for GE insects, USDA only considers whether the GE insect has 
an impact on communicable diseases of livestock and poultry, 
rather than broader environmental or ecological impacts.
criticAL cHALLeNGes cONFrONtiNG 
tHe cOOrDiNAteD FrAMeWOrK
No one expects the Coordinated Framework review process 
started by the Obama Administration to quickly solve any of the 
foundational problems with biotechnology regulation in the U.S. 
(4). But it will hopefully clarify the major issues and challenges, 
and bring new players and ideas into the ongoing policy-reform 
process.
I suspect that eventually the U.S. will be forced to upgrade 
the science supporting the assessment and management of risks 
arising from agricultural biotechnologies. The now-heavy dose of 
wishful thinking embedded in GE risk assessments will hopefully 
be replaced with hard science. Progress is especially needed in five 
areas in order to create a biotechnology regulatory framework 
that is as dynamic as the science and technology it seeks to help 
manage.
Focus on Fetal and child Development
To date, there has been little serious research on the impact of GE 
crops and technology on human reproductive performance and 
childhood development, despite wide recognition that untimely, 
very low dose pesticide and toxin exposures can trigger endocrine 
system and epigenetic effects of lasting consequence (10).
For this reason, it is indeed unfortunate that EPA has failed 
to invoke the historic, health-promoting provisions of the 1996 
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Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) in its assessments of the 
acceptability of GE technology. The FQPA calls for an added 
10-fold safety factor in regulating pesticides, and indeed any crop 
protection technology, when there is (a) uncertainty regarding 
risks to pregnant women, infants, and children or (b) inadequate 
data to characterize exposure levels (11).
On both of these counts, several GE technologies and their 
associated pesticides should have triggered the FQPA’s added 
safety factor. This is an area ripe for litigation.
Gene editing technologies
The high-priority issues throughout the review of the Coordinated 
Framework will surely include how to deal with gene editing tech-
nologies, such as RNAi, and other new gene editing technologies 
(e.g., CRISPR-cas9, TALEN, ZNF, and meganucleases) (4, 12). 
Many of these gene editing techniques will presumably not entail 
movement of foreign deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) into crops.
Under current policy, companies or teams using RNAi and 
gene editing tools can simply write to the USDA and request a 
letter from the Department acknowledging that the resulting GE 
plants are not “regulated articles.” To date, USDA has sent letters 
exempting over 30 GE plants from USDA reviews  –  including 
multiple glyphosate-tolerant crops and Loblolly pine trees with 
increased wood density.
If these new gene editing technologies are deemed exempt 
from U.S. regulatory reviews, as many in the GE industry have 
requested, these presumably safer technologies will invite intense 
scrutiny and likely create a new wave of litigation, market disrup-
tion, and labeling confusion.
New tools to Manage Adoption
The revised Framework must recognize that the scale of adoption 
of any GE crop technology will drive the nature and magnitude 
of possible adverse environmental, public health, or marketplace 
consequences.
Under current law and regulations, federal agencies assess 
the risks and benefits of a new GE technology when planted or 
adopted on a given field. It is assumed that the risks arising from 
the planting of any particular field to a GE crop will be determined 
solely by what happens in that field. Current risk assessments do 
not take into account whether a given GE technology is likely to 
be adopted on 1%, or 10%, or nearly 100% of the cropland planted 
to a specific crop.
Current policy and risk assessments also fail to consider incre-
mental and cumulative adverse impacts that can worsen over 
time, such as the rise in the costs of weed management (13, 14), 
loss of biodiversity, and increases in the volume and number of 
herbicide applications that invariably follow the emergence and 
spread of herbicide-resistant weeds (15–17).
For technologies that depend on biological and ecological 
impacts and interactions to work as intended (e.g., essentially all 
GE crop technologies), wider and more frequent use will generally 
result in additional, and/or potentially more severe, unintended 
consequences. This general rule applies to all biologically based 
technologies and has stood the test of time.
Going forward, the revised Coordinated Framework must 
grapple with the challenge of calibrating the sophistication and 
sensitivity of risk assessments, and risk mitigation interventions, 
to the scope of adoption and the magnitude of possible and 
actual adverse impacts. Fortunately, there are already accepted 
regulatory strategies and tools in place to do so in the U.S., and 
several have already been invoked in approvals of GE crop tech-
nology [e.g., refuge requirements, limiting deregulation decisions 
(approvals) to specific geographic areas or fixed time periods, and 
mandatory monitoring of target insects for resistance].
The revised Framework should work toward calibrating the 
risk assessment process to the scope of adoption by seeking 
from technology developers an estimate of the expected degree 
of market penetration in specific regions, within say 5  years 
of approval. Agencies could then focus risk assessments on 
high-adoption regions, and if deemed necessary, limit approv-
als or impose targeted monitoring or risk mitigation measures. 
After 5 years, the agency and technology developers could then 
re-assess estimates of adoption, actual experiences in the field, 
and the need for any further efforts to better characterize or 
mitigate risk.
Such new tools and authority is badly needed to avoid the pro-
liferation of collateral damage to farmers and the food industry 
(e.g., failing and increasingly expensive pest management sys-
tems; loss of markets) and/or the environment and public health.
Dealing with risks Arising from the 
emergence and spread of  
resistant Organisms
The failure of the Coordinated Framework to address the risk and 
consequences of resistance is a serious deficiency. In fairness to the 
agencies implementing the Coordinated Framework in the early 
years, several constructive steps were taken to build resistance 
management into the Bt-transgenic corn- and cotton-approval 
processes. These included sizable, mandatory refuges planted to 
non-GE-Bt seeds and rigorous, annual resistance monitoring of 
insect populations.
After about a decade of largely successful prevention, GE 
technology developers pressured the EPA to relax Bt-crop refuge 
requirements, despite warnings from many independent ento-
mologists. The consequences, and price tag, associated with this 
regrettable error in judgment are steadily rising and will continue 
rising for years to come.
To prevent resistance from eroding the benefits of GE crop 
technology and GE-based animal health and microbial products, 
the revised Framework should direct all federal agencies to take a 
variety of steps. The most important include
• sponsoring competitive research grant programs on the 
genetic mechanisms triggering resistance and/or the spread of 
GE technology-induced resistance;
• phasing out the use of antibiotic-related marker genes;
• requiring resistance risk assessments and management plans 
as a routine part of applications for approval and evaluating 
such plans via an independent review panel;
• post-approval resistance-monitoring provisions, including how 
ongoing resistance management testing will be paid for; and
• establishing resistance thresholds when exceeded will quickly 
trigger a second tier of resistance risk prevention strategies.
4Benbrook GE Regulation in the U.S.
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org March 2016 | Volume 4 | Article 59
Need for independent science
Most people expressing a view on how the Coordinated 
Framework needs to be updated agree on one thing  –  poor 
and inadequate science has become an endemic problem in the 
GE risk assessment and regulatory processes (4). The revised 
Coordinated Framework must broaden and deepen the science 
base supporting GE regulation in order to enhance confidence 
in the scientific judgments supporting government decisions on 
GE technology.
Another step is equally important in convincing those skepti-
cal of current GE crop safety assessments, within and outside the 
scientific community. The majority of the new, more sophisticated 
risk-assessment science should be conducted by scientific teams 
with no ties to the companies developing and marketing GE crop 
technology. In addition, institutions funding and carrying out 
this work should take proactive steps to insulate the individuals 
conducting the work from non-scientific criticisms, personal and 
professional attacks, and initiated or supported by GE companies 
and their surrogates. Regrettably, such unprecedented measures 
are now needed to slow the erosion of scientific integrity in this 
economically important, fast-moving area of technology.
Several practical, low-cost steps can be taken immediately. 
Federal agencies should require, as part of the application pro-
cess, a guarantee from technology developers that requests for 
isolines and/or genetic markers and probes, or other technical 
information necessary to conduct risks assessments will be pro-
vided to federal agency scientists and independent researchers, 
and without imposition of restrictions on what non-commercial 
research can be conducted with them, or when and how results 
may be reported.
The FDA should publicly disclose the data provided by GE 
technology developers and allow for public comments on these 
data as well as on the adequacy of risk assessments. Both steps 
should be completed before the GE organisms are allowed on the 
market. Approvals can then incorporate any needed actions and 
requirements, such as post-approval surveillance and additional 
testing for applications in areas outside those studied prior to 
commercial launch.
Before any field trial of a new GE trait, USDA should require 
and disclose the exact sequence information of the inserted genetic 
material so that USDA, the grain trade, and food companies can 
detect possible contamination. Presently, USDA does not require 
detailed sequence information and therefore has no way to detect 
contamination. In addition, the locations of GE field trials should 
be disclosed, so that neighboring farmers and the food industry 
can guard against genetic contamination.
Independent scientists should be awarded funding and granted 
both the needed time and data/tools necessary to conduct state-
of-the-art, GE technology risk assessments. They must be free to 
raise questions and reach independent conclusions without fear 
of personal or professional retaliation. Efforts to elucidate the 
metabolic-breakdown pathways of novel proteins in the edible 
portions of GE plants should receive special focus and dedicated 
funding, now that some widely consumed, GE fresh fruits 
(e.g., Artic apple) and vegetables (Innate potatoes, and Bt and 
Roundup Ready sweetcorn) have been approved and are in the 
food supply in several countries.
tOWArD A BriGHter FUtUre OF 
BiOtecH reGULAtiON iN tHe U.s.
Currently in the U.S., the trigger for GE regulatory oversight is 
based on the attributes of GE organisms not the process used to 
create them (e.g., GE via a gene gun). This is conceptually flawed 
and leads to all sorts of problems: the USDA exempts GE plants 
produced without plant pest DNA from its admittedly limited 
purview; the FDA allows GE plants to be treated as GRAS if 
deemed substantially equivalent, with little or no focus on novel 
risks that are outside the parameters considered in judging 
substantial equivalence. It also means that some of the risks 
associated with GE organism (genetic contamination, resistant 
pests) are simply neither assessed nor addressed.
Five steps discussed below address specific, concrete steps 
the U.S. federal government could take to improve the GE risk 
assessment and risk mitigation processes. Steps 3.1 and 3.5 
could be adopted relatively quickly, while more time to craft 
and implement solutions will be necessary in the case of the 
other three.
Adopt the internationally Accepted 
Definition of Biotechnology
The U.S. should adopt the definition of “modern biotechnology” 
set forth by the Codex Alimentarius in the Principles for the Risk 
Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology (18):
‘Modern biotechnology’ entails the application of:
(i) In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recom-
binant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injec-
tion of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or (ii) Fusion 
of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome 
natural physiological, reproductive, or recombinant 
barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional 
breeding and selection.
Assess All Aspects of Ge Applications
The new Coordinated Framework should direct federal agencies 
to take into account both the novel proteins and other compounds 
produced by a GE plant, as well as any other related chemicals that 
must be, or typically will be used in conjunction with the GE crop 
technology. These will, of course, include all herbicides associated 
with a herbicide-tolerant crop variety, as well as seed treatments 
marketed as important in order for farmers to bring a GE crop 
to harvest.
restore scientific integrity in Judging 
substantial equivalence
Despite its flaws, “substantial equivalence” is likely to remain 
part of the GE regulatory process. Accordingly, the erosion of 
scientific integrity in the assessment of GE crop equivalence must 
be reversed by
• Assuring that the protein, trait, or plant under investigation in 
risk-assessment studies is identical to those from the GE plant 
under evaluation;
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• No longer considering the range of “natural variation” in nutri-
ent and phytochemical levels in a GE crop versus its isoline, 
when both are grown in properly designed side-by-side trails;
• Requiring that the diet fed to control animals consists of the 
isoline of the GE crop being tested, and the GE crop and its 
isoline should be grown in the same environment; and
• The diet of the control animals should be tested for the pres-
ence of contamination from other GE crops and pesticides 
typically used in conjunction with GE crops.
Acknowledge that stacked varieties May 
Pose Unique risks
The new Framework should require agencies to develop new 
test requirements for stacked varieties, acknowledging that 
multiple traits and regulatory sequences can lead to unexpected 
interactions and possibly adverse outcomes, just as treatment 
with multiple medications can lead to drug interactions and 
contraindications.
require Labeling of Ge Products
All products from GE crops, animals, and microorganisms 
should be accurately labeled, both to ensure consumer choice 
and to enhance the odds that public health officials, doctors, 
and scientists will quickly recognize unexpected problems, 
if and when they arise. In addition, companies that develop 
GE organisms should be required to disclose any GE trait, 
marker genes, or other genetic constructs in commercial, GE 
seed products, including traits and genes from obsolete and no 
longer-marketed traits.
Today, FDA requires labeling on food products when there 
has been a change in a “material fact,” such as a food product’s 
nutritional value, organoleptic properties, or functional charac-
teristics. But several times in the past, and for good reason, the 
FDA has required labeling under the “material fact” construct in 
the absence of a change in nutritional value, organoleptic proper-
ties, or functional characteristics.
For example, in the final food irradiation rule, the FDA 
acknowledged that the large number of respondents who 
asked for labeling of irradiated retail products was evidence 
that irradiation was, indeed, a “material fact” (19). In its 
decision, the FDA wrote “Whether information is material 
under section 201(n) of the act depends not on the abstract 
worth of the information but on whether consumers view 
such information as important and whether the omission of 
label information may mislead a consumer. The large number 
of consumer comments requesting retail labeling attest to the 
significance placed on such labeling by consumers” (Emphasis 
added) (19).
Clearly, state and national polling, and the near 50–50% split 
in the voting on several state GE food ballot initiatives, is evidence 
of the significant consumer interest in whether a food product 
contains GE ingredients.
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